Pluralistic physicalism and the causal exclusion argument

Markus I. Eronen*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

30 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

There is a growing consensus among philosophers of science that scientific endeavors of understanding the human mind or the brain exhibit explanatory pluralism. Relatedly, several philosophers have in recent years defended an interventionist approach to causation that leads to a kind of causal pluralism. In this paper, I explore the consequences of these recent developments in philosophy of science for some of the central debates in philosophy of mind. First, I argue that if we adopt explanatory pluralism and the interventionist approach to causation, our understanding of physicalism has to change, and this leads to what I call pluralistic physicalism. Secondly, I show that this pluralistic physicalism is not endangered by the causal exclusion argument.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)219-232
Number of pages14
JournalEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Science
Volume2
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May-2012
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Explanatory pluralism
  • Physicalism
  • Pluralistic physicalism
  • Causal exclusion
  • Interventionism
  • Robustness

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